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This paper considers the productivity impact on the U.S. economy of the period of war 
mobilization and demobilization lasting from 1941 to 1948.  Optimists have pointed to 
learning by doing in military production and spinoffs from military R and D as the basis 
for asserting a substantial positive effect of military conflict on potential output.  
Productivity data for the private nonfarm economy are not consistent with this view, 
since they show slower TFP growth between 1941 and 1948 than before or after. The 









The historiography of the Great Depression in the United States has been 
overwhelmingly concerned with the sources of the deficiencies in aggregate demand 
responsible for more than a decade of double digit unemployment over the twelve year 
period 1929-1941.  The narrative has been infused with leitmotivs of failure and loss: of 
output, of employment, and of expenditure.  In contrast, the macroeconomic history of 
the golden age (1948-73), the quarter century following the end of demobilization, has, 
on balance, radiated the bright glow of success.  The emphasis has been on an American 
economic colossus standing astride the world in a position of dominance not realized 
before, or, in quite the same way, since (Ferguson, Colossus, p. 18).    
Awkwardly situated between Depression era ‘failure’ and postwar ‘success’ has 
been the Second World War,  a disruption to the ‘normal’ path of economic development 
every bit as significant, although in different ways, as was the Depression. As a 
consequence of its temporal location, the conflict has acquired almost mythological 
significance in bridging these two story lines, although it has in fact received relatively 
little detailed examination from macroeconomists and economic historians.  Conventional 
wisdom credits the war both with ‘bringing us out of the Depression’ and with ‘laying the 
foundations for postwar prosperity.’2   
There can be little doubt that the war administered a huge demand shock to the 
economy, especially from 1942 onwards, the result of a massive increase in deficit 
spending and an expansionary monetary policy committed to pegging both short and long 
term rates at low levels.3 The standard interpretation, however,  couples the demand 
story, at least implicitly, with emphasis on a powerful supply shock, one resulting from 
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learning by doing in military production (Searle, ‘Productivity’; Alchian, ‘Reliability’; 
Gemery and Hogendorn, ‘Learning Curves’) and spinoffs from military research and 
development (Ruttan, Is War Necessary).  That posited supply shock has to be a main 
underpinning of the claim that the war ‘laid the foundations for postwar prosperity.’  
My concern in this paper is principally with the second part of the conventional 
wisdom, that which credits much of the achieved level of potential output in 1948 to war 
induced positive supply shocks. To what degree was the war responsible for establishing 
the technological, organizational, and infrastructural preconditions for what Rostow 
called the ‘age of high mass consumption’? This paper follows upon a reconsideration of 
twentieth century U.S. economic growth that finds productivity advance between 1929 
and 1941 far stronger than has been traditionally appreciated (Field, ‘Most 
Technologically Progressive Decade’; ‘Technological Change’).  A corollary is a greater 
skepticism about the rosy supply side picture typically painted of the impact of the war 
years.  
The conventional productivity data for the private nonfarm economy show that 
TFP, which had been growing very rapidly between 1929 and 1941, continued to increase 
from 1941 to 1948, but at a markedly slower rate.  The conventional (Kendrick) data do 
show TFP higher in 1948 than it had been in 1941, although as I show at the end of the 
paper, much of the gap is eliminated if one makes a cyclical adjustment to take account 
of the fact that the economy in 1941 had not yet fully reattained potential output. The 
question I wish to pose is whether 1948 levels were higher than they would have been in 
the absence of the war. Stated alternately, one can ask whether these productivity levels 
might have been reached earlier in the absence of the conflict.  
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There is a strong case to be made, and this paper will attempt to make it, that 
whatever positive shocks may have been associated with progress in the mass production 
of airframes, ships, penicillin, or munitions/fertilizer were largely counterbalanced by the 
negative shocks associated with the disruptions to the economy resulting from rapid 
mobilization and demobilization.  Previous work has established that the years 1929 
through 1941 were marked by an exceptionally high rate of total factor productivity 
growth, with the consequence that a significant fraction of the productivity foundations of 
the postwar epoch were already in place by 1941, before full scale war mobilization 
(Field, ‘Most Technologically Progressive Decade’; ‘Technological Change’; ‘Equipment 
Hypothesis’; ‘Interwar Years and the 1990’).   Thus the rate of increase of TFP between 
1941 and 1948, even without a cyclical adjustment, is lower than is commonly realized.   
Why?  Mobilization/demobilization delivered a one-two punch, whipsawing the 
economy, as it first force fed very rapid expansion in a limited number of war related 
sectors, such as other transport equipment,  and then equally rapid contraction.  The 
conflict diverted the cream of American scientific and engineering talent, who had not 
been experiencing high unemployment rates during the Depression (see Margo, 
‘Depression Unemployment’), into military work such as the Manhattan project.  
Mobilization required that managers and workers pay attention not only to the wrenching 
tasks of reorienting production within and between sectors, but also to a panoply of 
regulations associated with government contracting and resource allocation in what, 
within the military and much of the civilian sector, approached a command economy 
(U.S. Civilian Production Administration, Mobilization for War).4   There was certainly 
some learning by doing in high profile sectors such as airframes and shipbuilding, and 
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some war related R and D spinoffs, such as microwaves and advances in electronics that 
benefited the nascent computer industry industry.  But there were opportunity costs, and 
the overall effect of the Second World War was probably to slow the growth of TFP and 
potential output.  The best way to describe the supply side effects of the war is that they 
represented, in the aggregate, a retardative supply shock, slowing down the breakneck 
pace of advance of potential output that had been achieved during the Depression years, 
largely fueled by advance of TFP.   
II. 
The supply shocks associated with mobilization and demobilization were short, they 
were sharp, and whether they were positive or negative, they were experienced almost 
entirely after the U.S. entered the war.5  The military build up, which was only beginning 
when Pearl Harbor was attacked in December of 1941, led to a massive ramp up in 
military and naval construction in 1942, a surge in equipment and ordnance production 
that peaked in 1943, and an expansion of employment in the Federal government, both 
civilian and military, that peaked in 1944.  By 1948, with demobilization largely 
complete, nonmilitary production revived, and unemployment at 3.8 percent, these 
changes had been almost entirely unwound. 
Either of these shocks alone would have imposed substantial transition costs on the 
economy.  Together they represented something of a double whammy.   The war put the 
economy through a wringer, not once, but twice.  From this perspective, it is hardly 
surprising that total factor productivity grew much more slowly between 1941 and 1948 
than it had between 1929 and 1941. 
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Although belief that the war had associated with it large positive productivity 
effects was common during the conflict and immediately thereafter, a more nuanced and 
pessimistic evaluation was shared by economists familiar with the effects of mobilization 
and demobilization.  Solomon Fabricant was an exemplar of this group; his general 
pessimism is echoed by Jules Backman and Martin Gainsbrugh (see Fabricant, 
‘Armament Production’; Backman and Gainsbrugh, ‘Productivity and Living Standards’).  
Here’s what Fabricant wrote in 1952: 
Despite beliefs frequently held to the contrary, little contribution to the 
defense effort may be expected from productivity….The composition and even the 
volume of output undergo radical transformation.  Speed rather than cost is the 
criterion.  And fundamental changes occur in the organization of the economy.  In a 
word, attention is diverted from the mainsprings of progress.  
In such a situation, the energy of businessmen is devoted not to new 
improvements and additions to knowledge, but to adapting standard mass 
production methods to the munitions industries.  And they are under the necessity 
of learning new rules.  Price, production, and other controls have to be studied and 
the very rapid and radical changes in them require attention.  Little time or energy is 
left for improving efficiency. 
…The new workers are inexperienced; and some are handicapped.  Some of 
the new equipment brought into production is standby equipment, not worth 
operating in normal times, and the flow of new and up to date equipment is slowed 
to a trickle. The mines reopened are low grade or high cost mines…. Inventories are 
inadequate, and delays in receiving materials hold up production lines.  Ersatz 
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materials frequently require more labor for processing. Long hours cut the strength 
of labor and management. 
As a result, national output per man hour fails to rise at the peacetime rate.  
 
Fabricant went on to note that railroads were an exception to this rule, because of 
their unusual cost structure, and that productivity declines  in trade and services were 
sometimes disguised because they took the form of deterioration in quality.  But ‘in most 
peacetime and manufacturing industries…, actual and palpable declines occur. For skilled 
labor is pulled away, transport is choked, and materials come hesitatingly and in meager 
quantity.’  
He concluded his analysis by acknowledging that some munitions manufacturing 
did experience rapid productivity gains.  He referred to the famous case of shipbuilding, 
noting a doubling of output per hour in the three years following Pearl Harbor.  But he 
also observed that these increases were from very low levels immediately following 
conversion, so that ‘even the wartime peak in productivity may be below the level of the 
industry’s peacetime productivity’ (Fabricant, ‘Armament Production’, pp. 30-31).  
Some of Fabricant’s arguments address why one cannot expect, overall, a big 
contribution to wartime output growth from productivity advance.  Many of the 
retardative forces, such as disruptions to production from erratic inventory control, would 
in principle disappear with the cessation of hostilities, with no permanent ill effects.  But 
other factors identified help explain why war imposed a persisting cost in terms of the 
trajectory of long term productivity advance.  Technical, scientific, and managerial 
energies were diverted from commercial pursuits towards the war effort.  There was 
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invention and learning by doing as a result, but not all of it was relevant when peace 
returned.  And there was an opportunity cost.  When scientists and engineers devote their 
time to building atomic bombs and businessmen are preoccupied with learning new 
administrative rules, and when success is measured by one’s ability to produce large 
quantities of ordnance quickly in an environment of cost plus contracts, it is scarcely 
surprising that the overall rate of commercially relevant innovative activity slows down.  
  TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1 reports the rates of total factor and labor productivity growth before, during 
and after the period of war mobilization and demobilization, calculated from the 
conventional data.  The choice of 1941 as a breakpoint is critical, and some discussion is 
warranted, since Kendrick and others who followed his example used 1937 (Kendrick, 
Productivity Trends).  1937 was a local peak (unemployment was still 14.3 percent), 
whereas in 1941 unemployment averaged less than 10 percent for the first time in a 
decade, and it is as  close as we can get to a fully employed peacetime economy before 
significant effects of war mobilization are experienced.  But while 1941 is far preferable 
to 1937, it is still not ideal, because unemployment was higher (9.9 percent) than it was in 
1929 (3.2 percent) or 1948 (3.8 percent).6  In any particular historical circumstance, 
productivity levels for an economy operating below capacity might be higher or lower 
were the economy operating at full employment.  Theory can provide a rationale for 
cyclical adjustment in either direction.  I leave to the penultimate section of this paper 
discussion of what kind of an adjustment one might make for the remaining cyclical 
effect, and how large it should be.   
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For the moment, the contrast between 2.31 percent per year (1929-41) and 1.29 
percent year (1941-1948) is quite enough to motivate the paper.  We begin with the 
striking observation that high TFP growth during the Depression years meant, according 
to these numbers, that achieved productivity levels in 1941 were more than 30 percent 
higher than was true in 1929.  Because of the absence of capital deepening over this 
period, this was true for both labor productivity and TFP.  Readers may have the 
impression that with Lend Lease and other expenditures in anticipation of war the U.S. 
was already on something like a full scale war footing by the time of Pearl Harbor.  If this 
were true, and if one were an ‘optimist’ about the effects of war on productivity, one 
might argue that some of the productivity levels in 1941 were attributable to the defense 
buildup that had already been underway for two years.   
It is important to appreciate how small a share of total war spending had actually 
taken place at the time Pearl Harbor was attacked.  The U.S. Departments of the Army 
and the Navy spent $1.8 billion on military manpower, structures, equipment, and other 
ordnance in 1940, and $6.3 billion in 1941 (Table 2, column 2; these figures exclude 
veterans’ benefits).  If one wanted to emphasize the extent of the build up in 1941 one 
could say that spending had more than tripled compared to the previous year.  But this is 
clearly dwarfed by what followed.  Combined Army and Navy spending in 1940 and 
1941 represented just 3.2 percent of the 1940-46 cumulative total.7  Adjusting for price 
changes makes virtually no difference in these calculations.  Column 1 of Table 2 reports 
the price index for national defense expenditures, rescaled so that 1940 = 100.  This index 
rises 6.7 percent in 1941, but then trends slightly downward, presumably reflecting some 
learning by doing and productivity improvement in the production of ordnance.  The 
 10
combined share of 1940 and 1941 spending in real terms (column 3) is still just 3.2 
percent of the cumulative 1940-46 total.8 
The picture is slightly modified if one considers a broader measure of spending on 
national defense, including Lend Lease, and spending by the Defense Plant Corporation, 
a subsidiary of the Depression era Reconstruction Finance Corporation.   By this 
measure, a total of about 5 percent of cumulative 1940-1945 military spending had taken 
place prior to Pearl Harbor (Table 2, columns 4 and 5). 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
Like total military spending, and not coincidentally, the average number of U.S. 
military personnel also more than tripled, comparing the calendar year 1941 with 1940.  
But one needs to appreciate both how almost completely demilitarized the U.S. economy 
had been during the Depression, and how much mobilization was still to come.  Figure 1, 
drawn from the 1951 Statistical Abstract of the United States, make this point vividly.  
The uptick in military personnel in 1941 looks large in comparison with 1940, but is 
dwarfed by what followed. And the 1.8 million average military personnel in 1941 seems 
trivially small in comparison with the armed forces of Germany, Japan, and Italy, each of  
which already had more than 7 million men in uniform, including reserves, at the 
beginning of 1940 (Nelson, Arsenal of Democracy, p. 30).  
      FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
The pattern observed in military manpower is also evident in the time series for US 
military aircraft production (Figure 2).  Output of 19,455 planes in 1941 was more than 
three times the 6,028 produced in 1940, but barely a fifth of peak (1944) production of 
95,272. 
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FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 
This pattern is even more pronounced for ship production (Table 3), in part because 
of the country’s urgent need after 1941 to make good on the losses suffered at Pearl 
Harbor.  Starting from low levels, production of combatant ships peaked in 1943, at more 
than 17 times 1941 levels.  The surge in production of landing craft in 1944, however, 
pushes the peak in total ships produced to that year.  
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
Finally let’s consider the division of industrial production between war and nonwar 
activity (Figure 3).  This chart, which is based on indexes compiled by the Federal 
Reserve Board, shows that in 1941 military production accounted for less than a fifth of 
the total, and civilian industrial production was still increasing.  In 1942, 1943, and 1944, 
on the other hand, civilian production declined, and military production accounted for 
more than half of the total (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, Statistical Abstract 1946, p. 104).  
                     FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE  
Federal Reserve Board industrial production data (Figure 4) also show that the 
wartime expansion of industrial production was almost exclusively a durable goods 
phenomenon.  These data show industrial production, both total and war related, peaking 
in 1943.  Total industrial production peaked in October, when manufacturing accounted 
for a larger share of U.S. value added than it ever had before or ever would again, and fell  
precipitously after February of 1945.9 
               FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE 
Individually, and in the aggregate, these data show that although the U.S. may have 
been ‘gearing up for war’ prior to 1942, it was doing so from a very low base, and what 
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had been accomplished through the end of 1941 was small compared to what would come 
subsequently.  Achieved levels of production, total factor productivity and output per 
hour in 1941 cannot have had much to do with learning by doing from military 
production or spillovers from military R and D. 
III. 
The next section of the paper takes a broader look at the effects of mobilization and 
demobilization on the economy, in particular on its manpower requirements.10  Tables 4 
and 5 are based on data on full time equivalent workers from the 1986 National Income 
and Product Accounts.  What I have done is divide the major sectors of the economy into 
those acquiring and those releasing workers between 1941 and 1943 (Table 4) and 
between 1943 and 1948 (Table 5).  Although total military spending and military 
manpower continued to rise in 1944, 1943 represented the peak of industrial production 
and economic mobilization per se (see Figure 4).  For the sake of consistency I have used 
it as the breakpoint for the analysis of both governmental and nongovernmental 
employment.   
For the nongovernmental sector we find the following major sectors releasing 
workers between 1941 and 1943:  the motor vehicle industry, construction, wholesale and 
retail trade, and agriculture.  Together, these five sectors account for 1.026 million of the 
total 1.580 million FTEs contributed by releasing sectors over this two year period.   
We then identify six major sectors acquiring workers.  The largest by far was other 
transport equipment (not motor vehicles).   This sector, which was producing the ships 
and planes already discussed, as well as a variety of other vehicles, acquired over a two 
year period a mind-boggling 2.6 million FTEs, a 384 percent increase over its 1941 
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employment of 675 thousand FTEs.  The second biggest acquirer of labor was iron and 
steel and their products, including ordnance, followed by nonelectric machinery, electric 
machinery, chemicals, and railroad transportation.  Together these six sectors accounted 
for 88 percent of the total increase of 5.302 million FTEs in the acquiring sectors. 
It is striking how narrowly concentrated were the sectors acquiring labor. Other 
transport equipment accounted for 49 percent of the increase in FTEs in acquiring 
sectors.  Adding in iron and steel products including ordnance, one gets to 64 percent.  In 
contrast, the two largest releasing sectors (motor vehicles and construction) accounted for 
barely 34 percent of the total FTEs contributed by releasing sectors.  FTE acquisitions 
were therefore much more highly concentrated than FTE releasers.  Economic 
mobilization for war was very far from a balanced, across the board expansion of the 
economy. 
This methodology does not capture flows within sectors.  For example, automobile 
production effectively ceased in February of 1942, and workers remaining in the motor 
vehicles industry were producing military vehicles such as jeeps and trucks. 
We now turn to the government sector, where between 1941 and 1943 we find 
1.317 million released from work relief and 132 thousand released from state and local 
government employment.  Between 1941 and 1943 the U.S. military acquired 7.349 
million FTEs and Federal civilian employment another 1.553 million.  Finally, 
government enterprises acquired 74,000.    
Overall, summing the non-government sector consolidated acquisition of 3.722 
million and the government sector consolidated acquisition of 7.527 million, we have a 
net inflow from the ranks of the unemployed or not in the labor force of 11.249 million.  
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Taken together, mobilization led to a rapid expansion of the economy, but one 
which represented a very sharp distortion of the ‘normal’ channels of such an expansion. 
Although nongovernment FTEs peaked in 1943, total FTEs peaked in 1944 at 
54.982 million (1.3 million above the 1943 total), largely because of an additional 
increment of 2.3 million military FTEs which counterbalanced the declines beginning 
elsewhere.  Military equipment had to be produced before it could be used.  By the time 
of D-Day, the military goods production machine had already begun to wind down.  
In the short span of two years, between 1941 and 1943, the US automobile industry 
shut down and reconverted to defense production. Nondefense construction largely 
ground to a halt, as military and naval construction soared.  People streamed out of farms 
and wholesale and retail trade into defense factories and the military, and they were 
joined by hundreds of thousands, indeed millions more from the ranks of the unemployed 
and not in the labor force.  Billions of dollars were spent by the Defense Plant 
Corporation to build government owned privately operated plants and equip them with 
machine tools to jump start the airframe and shipbuilding industries, produce aviation 
fuel and synthetic rubber, and aluminum.  Then, before the economy could catch its 
breath, most of the ordnance was expended, the war was won, and full scale 
demobilization was underway.   
                               TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 5 uses the same methodology to study demobilization from 1943 to 1948.  
What we see here is a rough reversal of the trends associated with mobilization.  The two 
biggest acquirers of labor during mobilization, other transport equipment and iron and 
steel and their products, including ordnance, were the two biggest releasers during 
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demobilization, and the FTEs released by these two sectors (3.388 million) were almost 
exactly equivalent to those acquired during mobilization (3.415 million).  Symmetrically, 
the biggest acquirers of labor during demobilization were largely the sectors that had 
released the most during mobilization, in particular motor vehicles, retail and wholesale 
trade, and construction.  Another big acquirer was finance, insurance, and real estate. 
Home building and nonresidential private construction, as well as other forms of physical 
capital accumulation revived in the postwar period, finally surpassing 1929 rates after 
two decades in which investment had been depressed (the Depression years) or largely 
government controlled (the war years).  Employment in intermediation and brokering 
correspondingly increased. Agriculture, on the other hand, continued to lose FTEs, 
reflecting a long term secular trend. 
The analysis understates the impact of demobilization in the government sector, 
since government FTEs peaked in 1944.  The military added an additional 2.336 million 
FTEs between 1943 and 1944, although other components of government FTEs were 
largely unchanged.  Federal civilian FTEs went up 23,000, government enterprises went 
down 26,000, state and local lost another 79,000, and the remaining 47,000 on work 
relief left this category.  The huge increase in the military would make the outflows from 
government larger for an analysis based on a 1944-1948 transition. 
                                          TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
The standard expenditure data (Figure 5), expressed as proportions of gross national 
product, show that during the war rising proportions of Government spending crowded 
out domestic private investment, net exports, and consumption (the current account went 
into deficit largely because of unilateral transfers, including Lend-Lease).  These 
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numbers do show the absolute value of consumption rising in real terms throughout the 
war, except in 1942, although Higgs (‘Wartime Prosperity’, ‘Regime Uncertainty’, 
‘Central Planning to the Market’) has argued that this is misleading because the price 
deflators used do not correctly measure the increasing real costs of goods in the context 
of rationing or simple unavailability.  In other words, he would have the series for real 
personal consumption spending dip substantially during the war years before reviving. 
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE 
Although the question of how much real consumption rose or dropped during the 
war remains at issue (see Rockoff, ‘Ploughshares to Swords’;  Edelstein, ‘War and the 
American Economy, p. 400), there is little dispute that government spending increased 
and that private investment in the country declined, not just as shares of GDP, but in 
absolute terms.  There were also significant changes in the composition of public 
investment.  Figures 6 and 7 show trends in public and private construction expenditures.  
The nominal data are taken from Table A-18, p. 188 of the Economic Report of the 
President, 1951.  The deflators are taken from the Bureau of Economic Analysis website, 
accessed April 2, 2005.  Private residential construction spending is deflated by the 
residential structures index. All of the other series, both private and public, are deflated 
by the index for private nonresidential structures.  The indexes are rescaled so that 1929 = 
100.0, and consequently for that date, real equals nominal. 
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE 
Several conclusions are apparent from these charts.  First, residential construction, 
the sick child of the U.S. economy throughout much of the Depression (see Field, 
‘Uncontrolled Land Development’), had by 1941 laboriously climbed back to within 
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striking distance of its 1929 level. The war took the steam out of this forward movement, 
and by 1944 private housing construction was at an even lower level than it had been at 
the depths of the Depression in 1933.  It was not until 1948 that residential construction 
surpassed its 1929 rate. Nonresidential private construction was also depressed during the 
war, driven almost to the vanishing point in 1943.  Other private construction, largely 
public utilities, was less dramatically affected by the war, principally because energy, 
especially electric power, was critical to the war effort.   
If we look at public construction, we are first struck by the big peak for 1942 in 
military and naval construction and other public nonresidential building.  Mobilization 
for war can be thought of as consisting of three waves, each cresting respectively in the 
years 1942, 1943 and 1944.  1942 saw massive military construction, 1943 the peak in 
military industrial production, and 1944 the peak in military FTEs.  Build the production 
facilities, produce the ordnance, and then let the military use it.   
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE 
A second point to note, which I have stressed in earlier work, is the high rate of 
street and highway construction during the Depression years.  This spending remained 
close to or above 1929 levels through 1941, creating a modern surface road infrastructure 
that was essentially complete by the outbreak of the war.  War spending crowded out 
highway construction during the war, and this spending came back more slowly than 
housing production immediately after the war.  The public infrastructure spending of the 
1930s had already begun to generate spillovers in transportation, distribution, and 
housing before the war.11  It continued to do so afterwards.  Thus the case that it was a 
combination of product and process innovation during the Depression, and Depression 
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era infrastructure building, far more than the war, that was responsible for 1948 
productivity levels.  
We can also see in this chart the impact of bridge, dam, tunnel, and other non-
highway public infrastructure spending during the Depression.  This too was crowded out 
during the war years, although the magnitude of the drop was lower, partly because 
recovery had been less dramatic  
IV. 
The purpose of this penultimate section is to consider a cyclical adjustment for 1941 
productivity, and an adjustment to 1948 productivity based on inadequate accounting for 
government owned privately operated capital sold to the private sector after the war, and 
how such adjustments might affect the relative magnitude of productivity growth during 
the period of mobilization and demobilization. 
The standard of the business in measuring productivity change over time is, if 
possible, to calculate from peak to peak, so as to control for cyclical confounds.  1941, 
with its 9.9 percent unemployment, is not ideal in this respect.  The question is whether 
productivity levels in 1941 would have been higher or lower had the economy been at 
full employment, and if so by how much.  Traditional economic models with constant 
returns to scale suggest that productivity should move countercyclically.  The argument is 
that labor experiences diminishing returns as increasing doses are applied to a capital 
stock largely fixed in the short run. Correspondingly, when unemployment rates fall, so 
would capital labor ratios and along with them, productivity levels.  
 The data, on balance, has not been kind to this hypothesis, in the sense that during 
a number of epochs productivity has moved with, rather than against the cycle.  This 
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history, in turn, has led theorists to search for explanations of procyclicality.  The most 
widely cited factor is labor hoarding, but it seems unlikely that this could have played an 
important role over a twelve year period experiencing first a severe drop in employment 
and then a recovery of similar magnitude (hours for the private nonfarm economy were 
essentially the same in 1941 as they had been in 1929).  Other mechanisms, however, 
could account for procyclicality.  These include network externalities and, in general, any 
factors that might conduce to increasing returns to scale. Such conditions would be 
particularly prevalent where innovation and investment in infrastructure was an important 
contributor to higher TFP. 
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE 
The Depression years, in fact, were one of those periods evidencing strongly 
procyclical productivity, as Figure 8 clearly shows.  Table 6 provides the underlying data.  
The first column shows Kendrick’s index of total factor productivity for the private 
nonfarm economy.  Column 2 shows the continuously compounded rate of change in that 
index from one year to the next. Column 3 is the national civilian unemployment rate 
from Lebergott, and column 4 the change in percentage points in that rate. 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
If we regress the change in TFP (∆TFP) on the change in the unemployment rate 
(∆UR), we get the following results: 
         ∆TFP =         .0283    -    .0092* ∆UR 
          R2 = .647      (3.02)       (-4.28) 
 
          (t statistics in parentheses; data are for 1929-41; n = 12) 
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The intercept term can be interpreted as showing that TFP had a trend growth rate 
of approximately 2.83 percent per year over this twelve year period.  The coefficient on 
∆UR suggests that every percentage point decrease in the unemployment rate raised TFP 
growth by about .92 percent, or close to a percentage point, with every percentage point 
increase in the unemployment rate doing the opposite.  We can use this equation for two 
closely related exercises, first to make a cyclical adjustment to the 1941 productivity 
level and second to imagine what one more year of peacetime growth and declining 
unemployment would have meant for productivity in the U.S.  
If one is a war productivity optimist, one thinks of 1948 as the first year in which a 
demobilized peacetime economy benefited from all the new production knowledge 
generated during the war, and this influences one’s interpretation of its achieved 
productivity level.  A better way to think of 1948, in my view, is that it is 1941 with full 
employment.  The major new consumer product, television, had had all of its 
development work done before the war, been rolled out to the public at the New York 
World’s Fair in 1939, but had its commercial exploitation delayed until after the war.  
One can tell a similar story about nylon, over which women went wild when it was first 
introduced in 1939, before the war, diverting its use from stocking to parachute 
production, made it a scarce civilian commodity.  The 1948 surface transport 
infrastructure, which underlay productivity levels in distribution, transportation, and 
housing, had been almost entirely completed before 1942.   
All of this suggests that if we imagine a world without the disruptions of the war, 
with the economy continuing a rapid progression towards full employment in 1942, 
productivity levels in 1942 could well have approached those achieved in 1948. In a 
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closely related exercise, we can ask what productivity levels would have been in 1941 
had unemployment been at 1948 levels (3.8 percent). 
Unemployment in 1948 was 6.1 percentage points lower than it had been in 1941.  
Using the estimated coefficient from the above regression, we can predict that had 
unemployment in 1941 been as low as it was in 1948, TFP would have been 5.61 percent 
higher than it was (-.0092 * -6.1 = .0561).  TFP in 1948, measuring using natural logs, 
was 9 percent higher than 1941.  So close to two-thirds of the productivity gap between 
1941 and 1948 would be eliminated if we make a cyclical adjustment to the 1941 data.   
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
Any positive cyclical adjustment to measured 1941 productivity to account for the 
fact that the economy had not yet reached capacity would raise the estimated TFP growth 
rate between 1929 and 1941, and lower it between 1941 and 1948.  Kendrick’s TFP index 
for the private nonfarm economy stands at 132.0 for 1941.  If we make the 5.61 percent 
adjustment implied by the above analysis, we are at a cyclically adjusted 1941 level of 
139.6. The level for 1948 is 144.5, implying less than a half a percent growth (.49 percent 
per year) between 1941 and 1948, as compared with 2.78 percent per year between 1929 
and 1941.12   Table 7 revises the numbers reported in Table 1 to include rates of growth 
based on a cyclically adjusted productivity level for 1941. It is notable, and quite 
remarkable, that the calculated growth in output per hour between 1929 and 1941 is just 
short of that registered during the golden age (1948-73), even in the complete absence of 
any private sector capital deepening during the earlier period.  The revised numbers, 
including growth rates for output per hour, are bolded. 
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The 1941-48 growth rate would be further reduced were one to make an adjustment 
to 1948 TFP for the value of formerly GOPO (government owned, privately operated) 
capital, much of which was already in the hands of the private sector by 1948 (the major 
exception was synthetic rubber, which was not completely deaccessioned until 1955). 
Gordon has argued that this capital was often sold off in sweetheart deals, and that its 
value has not been adequately included in the standard capital stock measures (see 
Gordon ‘$45 billion of Investment Mislaid’; Rockoff, ‘Ploughshares to Swords’, p. 106).  
If the capital stock input should be higher for 1948, the level of TFP in that year would 
have to be lower, and so, by definition, would its rate of growth between 1941 and 1948.  
It would not take a large nod in Gordon’s direction on this account to reach a cyclically 
adjusted rate of growth of TFP of close to 0 for the private nonfarm economy between 
1941 and 1948.13 
We can also ask, counterfactually, what might have happened had the Japanese 
attack been delayed twelve months. Due to the disruptions associated with conversion 
and war mobilization TFP in actuality grew hardly at all between 1941 and 1942 (132.5 
vs. 132).  But suppose the economy had experienced one more year of peacetime growth 
in which the economy benefited from the 1929-41 trend growth rate in TFP and the 
unemployment rate fell to 1948 levels.  The regression results suggest that in this case, 
1948 productivity levels would have been approached in 1942.  This conjecture is based 
on adding the 2.83 intercept term from the equation, for one year of additional growth 
based on the peacetime trend growth rate, to the 5.61 percent cyclical adjustment, the 
predicted increase in TFP from a drop in the unemployment rate of 6.1 percentage points.  
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Summing these two terms leads to a predicted level of TFP in 1942 8.4 percent higher 
than 1941, just shy of the measured 1948 level.14 
On average, there were 5.560 million unemployed in 1941. Had the unemployment 
rate been at its 1948 level of 3.8 percent, with higher employment in construction, motor 
vehicles, other manufacturing sectors, wholesale and retail trade, and finance, insurance 
and real estate, 3.547 million of them would have been at work.  Unemployment was 
falling rapidly during 1941. In the fourth quarter it was down to an average of 3.4 
million, with a civilian labor force of 53.9 million, yielding an unemployment rate of 6.3 
percent (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract 1946,  p. 173).   
Had trends persisted in the absence of war, employment, TFP, and labor 
productivity would all likely have been higher in 1942.  As Figure 6 shows, housing 
construction was robust and growing in 1939, 1940 and 1941, and when the postwar 
housing boom emerged with full force in 1948, it took off from where it had been 
arrested in 1941.  Since the failure of residential construction to revive fully was one of 
the major contributors to the persistence of low private investment spending during the 
Depression, its signs of revival in the years immediately preceding the war suggest that 
had peace continued, investment, output and employment growth would have continued 
as the economy reapproached capacity. 
One concludes from this analysis that the 1.29 percent per year cumulative growth 
in TFP per year between 1941 and 1948 calculated from the standard data, a rate of 
growth already much lower than that recorded between 1929 and 1941, overstates 
productivity advance across the period of mobilization and demobilization. Both of the 
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adjustments discussed strengthen the relative importance of productivity advance 
between 1929 and 1941, and weaken its likely magnitude between 1941 and 1948. 
V. 
By 1948 the US economy had demobilized, the civilian economy was booming, and 
unemployment stood at the low peacetime rate of 3.8 percent.  Housing and private 
nonresidential building had finally risen above their 1929 levels, as had automobile 
production. Between 1941 and 1948, TFP in the private nonfarm economy, according to 
the standard measures, grew at a compound annual rate of 1.29 percent of year, 
respectable in comparison with 1973-89, but far below the rapid advance before (1929-
41) or after (1948-73).  As the previous section suggests, the underlying rate of advance 
between 1941 and 1948 reflected in these numbers is probably overstated. 
We come back to the question posed at the start of this essay.  How much of the 
achieved productivity level of the 1948 civilian economy should reasonably be attributed 
to the war?  The two main components of the ‘war stimulates productivity growth’ thesis 
involve learning by doing in military production and spinoffs from military research and 
development.   
Much attention has been paid to the success stories in producing ships and 
airframes.  There are several reasons, however, why one should be skeptical that this had 
much to do with how the economy performed in 1948.  First, as Fabricant noted, the 
initial productivity levels immediately following conversion to military production were 
often low (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, United States at War, p. 433).  Some of what one 
is seeing is improvement from this base.  Second, much of the success here involved the 
application to these military goods of mass production methods that had been pioneered 
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in the 1920s and the 1930s in the civilian economy.   In other words, organizational and 
technical advances prior to 1942 probably had a greater contribution to the success of 
economic mobilization than the latter did to postwar productivity levels.  Even on the 
technical (as opposed to production side), it is notable that there was not a single combat 
aircraft seeing major service produced during the Second World War that was not already 
on the drawing boards before it began.15   
Finally, and most importantly, whatever commodity specific learning by doing took 
place between 1942 and VJ day in 1945 was largely irrelevant by 1948 because most of it 
applied to the other transport equipment sector, and that sector, having practically 
quadrupled in size between 1941 and 1943 (based on FTEs), was smaller in 1948 than it 
had been in 1941. Few of the ships and aircrafts about which so much has been written 
(Liberty Ships or B-29’s, for example)16 were produced after the war.  Even those for 
which the production of civilian counterparts continued, such as the C-47/DC-3, had 
much smaller postwar production runs.  Other dual use vehicles, such as trucks, had 
fewer units produced annually between 1942 and 1945 than had been the case in 1941 or 
even 1937 (U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, Series Q-150, p. 716).  Here 
again, it is much more likely that success in producing these vehicles in volume derived 
from prewar experience in civilian manufacturing, as opposed to the war contributing 
dramatically to postwar capabilities.   
To the degree learning by doing took place in war industries, it involved 
innovations in workplace organization, materials flow, sequencing of tasks, and the 
acquisition of job and product specific human capital.  Because of the shrinkage of the 
other transport goods sector and the disappearance of many of the wartime products from 
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the postwar output mix, little of this learning would have had much influence on 1948 
productivity levels.17  
The second component of the thesis emphasizes spillovers from military research 
and development.  Items often referenced include microwaves, advances in electronics 
benefiting the computing industry, atomic power, and techniques for mass producing 
penicillin.  Unlike learning by doing producing Sherman tanks, the penicillin experience 
clearly had more peacetime applicability, as did improved techniques learned on the 
battlefield for treating trauma.  But with computers, microwaves and atomic power, and 
many of the other putative spillover candidates, one has to ask how much the war 
accelerated a scientific and technological trajectory that was proceeding very well prior to 
it.   
The scientific and engineering community, in cooperation with government 
officials, managers and workers had, by all accounts, and based on our experience with 
war mobilization, done a superb job in helping to expand the potential output of the 
economy between 1929 and 1941.  This community was then asked to drop much of what 
it was doing and focus on challenges central to the war effort.  In the process, some 
discoveries and learning useful for civilian production took place.  But these were 
incidental to the war effort, and entailed opportunity costs in the forms of disruptions of 
the trajectory of technical advance in the civilian economy. It is unlikely on balance that 
the stock of economically relevant knowledge (both technical knowledge and production 
knowledge) was on balance higher compared to what it would have been in the absence 
of war.   
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Employment of scientists and engineers in US manufacturing increased 74 percent 
between 1927 and 1933, and then almost tripled between 1933 and 1940.   Growing at a 
compound rate of 13.3 percent per year the number of scientists and engineers in U.S. 
manufacturing increased from 10,918 to 27,777 over that seven year period.  The rate of 
increase between 1940 and 1946 slowed to 8.4 percent per year (Mowery and Rosenberg, 
‘Twentieth Century’, p. 814), and both Schmookler (Invention and Economic Growth) 
and Mensch (Stalemate in Technology), in their enumerations of basic innovations, 
record sharp declines following the peak in the five year period 1935-39.   
There continues to be a popular perception that war is beneficial to an economy, 
particularly if it does not lead to much physical damage to the country prosecuting it. The 
U.S. experience during the Second World War is the typical poster child for this point of 
view. The effect of detailed research into the effects of armed conflict, however, has 
usually been to produce more nuanced interpretations.  For example, an earlier tradition 
(Hacker, Triumph of American Capitalism) saw the Civil War as a tremendous stimulus 
to the Northern economy, whereas more systematic quantitative inquiry has led to an 
emphasis on its retardative effects on growth (Goldin and Lewis, ‘Cost of the Civil 
War’).  In that spirit, the research reported on in this paper represents a revisionist 
approach to the analysis of the Second World War, although one which is not entirely 
unanticipated.18  As we become more comfortable thinking of the latter half of the 
twentieth century as an appropriate venue for economic history research, it will be 
appropriate to delve more deeply as well into the Cold War’s impact on the growth of 
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Sources:  1919-48:  Kendrick (1961), Table A-XXIII. 1948-2000, Bureau of Labor 






1919-29 2.02 2.27 
1929-41 2.31 2.35 
1941-48 1.29 1.71 
1948-73 1.90 2.88 
1973-89 .34 1.34 




U.S. Military Spending, Nominal and Real, 1940-46 (billion dollars) 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 
 Price Index     Army and Navy 




Defense Nominal Real Nominal Real 
1940 100.0 1.8 1.8 2.5 2.5 
1941 106.7 6.3 5.9 14.3 13.4 
1942 104.4 22.9 21.9 51.1 48.9 
1943 105.5 63.4 60.1 84.2 79.8 
1944 103.8 76.0 73.2 94.5 91.0 
1945 104.5 80.5 77.0 82.0 78.5 
TOTAL  250.9 240.0 328.6 314.2 
 
 
Sources:        Column 1: www.bea.gov, National Income and Product Accounts, Table 1.5.4; accessed 4/3/2005. 
Column 2: the sum of outlays by the Departments of the Army and the Navy: U.S. Bureau of the Census 
(1975), Series Y    458, 459, p. 1114. 
Column 3:  Column 2/Column 1. 
Column 4:  total national defense spending.  Source:  www.bea.gov, National Income and Product 
Accounts, Table 3.9.5, accessed 7/13/2006. 




                        Table 3 
US Military Ship Production, 1941-1946   
       
       
 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 
       
Combatants (Total) 33 141 568 420 152 73 
   Battleships 2 4 2 2   
   Aircraft Carriers 1 1 15 8 5 7 
   Aircraft Carriers (large)     2  
   Aircraft Carriers (escort) 2 13 50 37 13 4 
   Battle Cruisers    2   
   Heavy Cruisers   4 2 8 4 
   Light Cruisers 1 8 7 11 7 6 
   Destroyers 16 81 128 84 74 38 
   Destroyer Escorts   306 197 6  
   Submarines 11 34 56 77 37 14 
       
Patrol and mine craft 167 743 1106 640 238 6 
Auxiliaries 83 184 303 630 402 43 
Landing Craft 1035 9488 21525 37724 17958 21 
District Craft 261 786 677 577 661 48 
TOTAL 1579 11342 24179 39991 19411 191 
       
Source:  Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1947, p. 222.   
Note: data for 1945 include a total of 457 converted ships: 5 patrol and mine craft, 240 




                     Table 4 
United States, 1941-1943 
Labor Acquirers and Labor Releasers 
 
Non Government   (Full Time Equivalents, thousands)  
Labor Releasers:  FTE's Released 1941 FTEs 
  Motor vehicles and equipment.................                (330) 655 
  Contract Construction                (208) 1774 
  Wholesale trade..................................                (200) 1952 
  Farms                  (179) 2201 
  Retail trade.....................................                (109) 5075 
     Sum, above 5 sectors             (1,026)  
  Total Labor Releasers             (1,580)  
     
   FTE's Acquired  
Labor Acquirers    
      Other transportation equipment...............              2,596  675 
      Iron and steel and their products, incl. ordnance.                 819  1641 
      Machinery, except electrical.................                 370  1087 
      Electric and electronic equipment............                 353  607 
      Chemicals and allied products................                 269  580 
      Railroad transportation......................                 249  1285 
        Sum, above 6 sectors              4,656   
      Total Labor Acquirers              5,302   
     
     
Government    
Labor Releasers    
    Work Relief              (1,317) 1364 
    State and local..................................                (132) 2922 
     
Labor Acquirers    
  Military                7,349  1680 
    Federal civilian, except work relief              1,553  944 
    Government enterprises                   74  431 
     
Totals: Inflows from Unemployed, NILF   
   Non-government sector              3,722   
   Government sector               7,527   
   TOTAL             11,249  
 
Source:  National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929-1982.  
Washington:  Government Printing Office, 1986, Table 6.7a, p. 275. 
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Table 5 
Labor Acquirers and Labor Releasers, United States, 1943-1948 (x 1,000) 
 
Non Government     
Labor Acquirers     
    FTEs acquired 1943 FTEs 
  Retail trade..................................... 1,511 4,966 
  Services......................................... 756 5,226 
  Contract Construction  712 1,566 
  Wholesale trade.................................. 676 1,752 
  Motor vehicles and equipment................. 441 325 
  Finance, insurance, and real estate.............. 281 1,389 
  Telephone and telegraph...................... 202 490 
  TOTAL  Acquired    6,099  
    
       
  
Labor Releasers       FTEs released  
      
      Other transportation equipment............... (2,800) 3,271 
      Iron and steel and their products, incl. ordnance. (588) 2,460 
      Chemicals and allied products................ (126) 849 
      Electric and electronic equipment............ (73) 960 
      Agriculture, Forestry, Fisheries (56) 2,121 
      Nonferrous metals and their products (32) 508 
      Railroad transportation...................... (31) 1,534 
TOTAL  Releasing 
 (3,709)  
Government    
Labor Acquirers    
   State and Local  1,062 2,790 
     
Labor Releasers    
   Federal civilian (not work relief)  (1,119) 2,497 
   Government Enterprises (294) 505 
   Work relief  (47) 47 
   Military   (7,485) 9,029 
     
TOTALS  
   Government net release   (7,883)  
     Non government net acquires                                                            2,390 
     TOTAL Outflows to unemployed, NILF                                                            5,493 
 
     Source:  See Table 4. 
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Table 6 
Cyclical Effects on Total Factor  






















  Sources:  Kendrick, 1961; Lebergott, 1964. 
 
 
 PNE TFP Change unemployment  
  from prior Rate Change 
 (Kendrick) year (Lebergott) % points 
  (ln(t)-ln(t-1))   
1929 100.0  3.2  
1930 96.5 -0.0356 8.7 5.5 
1931 95.3 -0.0125 15.9 7.2 
1932 90.5 -0.0517 23.6 7.7 
1933 88.7 -0.0201 24.9 1.3 
1934 101.2 0.1318 21.7 -3.2 
1935 105.9 0.0454 20.1 -1.6 
1936 112.6 0.0613 16.9 -3.2 
1937 114.4 0.0159 14.3 -2.6 
1938 115.0 0.0052 19.1 4.8 
1939 119.4 0.0375 17.2 -1.9 
1940 122.4 0.0248 14.6 -2.6 
1941 132.0 0.0755 9.9 -4.7 
     
1948 144.5 0.0905 3.8 -6.1 
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Table 7 
Compound Annual Growth of Total Factor and Labor Productivity, United States, 
















1919-29 2.02 2.27 
1929-41 2.78 2.83 
1941-48  .49   .91 
1948-73 1.90 2.88 
1973-89 .34 1.34 
1989-2000 .78 1.92 
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Figure1
     
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1951, p. 210. 
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Source:  Economic Report of the President, 1951, p. 56. 
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.                                                                Figure 6 
























































Sources:   See text.   Nominal Data:  Economic Report of the President, 1951,  Table A-18, p. 188. 
                Deflators:  www.bea.gov,  accessed April 2, 2005.   
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Figure 7 
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1 This paper has benefited from presentations at the CEPR-CREI workshop on "War and 
the Macroeconomy" in Barcelona, Spain, June 29-30, 2005 and the ASSA meetings in 
Boston, Massachusetts, January 7, 2006, as well as comments from seminar participants 
at Stanford University, Columbia University, Humboldt University (Berlin), Universidad 
Carlos III (Madrid), All Souls College (Oxford University), the London School of 
Economics, and the University of California, Riverside. 
 
2 The demand side argument is widely understood, and not the main focus of this article; 
details of the magnitude of the fiscal and monetary stimulus can be found in Edelstein, 
‘War and the American Economy’.  The supply side story is frequently more implicit, but 
equally common. Optimism about the supply side effects of war is reflected, for example, 
in Baumol’s comment in 1986 that “... except in wartime, for the better part of a century, 
U.S. productivity growth rates have been low ...” (Baumol, ‘Productivity Growth’, p. 
1073).  For a more recent illustration, see Ruttan, Is War Necessary. Presumptions about 
the long term economic benefits of war have, perhaps understandably, been somewhat 
less prevalent in Europe. 
3 This demand shock was sufficient to end the Depression, in the sense that it drove 
unemployment from 9.9 percent in 1941 to under 2 percent within two years.  But was it 
necessary? By the end of the 1930s (and certainly by 1941) the private economy was on 
the road to recovery, and might have continued in that direction, even in the absence of 
the growing stimulus from the government sector. Of all components of autonomous 
spending, residential construction took the longest to reapproach levels experienced 
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during the 1920s (Field, ‘Uncontrolled Land Development’).  Nevertheless, after 
reaching a nadir in 1933, it climbed back steadily, and by 1941, before the war curtailed 
private house construction, it was approaching 1929 levels (see Figure 6; housing had 
actually peaked in 1926)). Some of the recovery after 1939, one might argue, was in 
response to the stimulus provided by anticipatory rearmament spending.  But, as I show 
below, only a small fraction of cumulative war spending had actually taken place at the 
time Pearl Harbor was attacked. 
4Although the U.S. did not resort to an industrial draft, as did Britain, where workers 
could be commanded (rather than enticed) to work in a war industry, the U.S. did 
effectively socialize investment flows and direct them in ways dictated by the imperatives 
of war (see Higgs, ‘Wartime Socialization’).  As Figures 5, 6, and 7 show, private 
domestic investment, as well as non-war related public investment, such as the 
construction of streets and highways, was crowded out during the conflict, and vast 
amounts of taxed or borrowed money was used by the government, through the 
instrument of the Defense Plant Corporation, to purchase new machine tools and 
construct plants in strategic sectors.  Civilian automobiles and appliance production was 
shut down, and critical raw material flows were allocated essentially by fiat, with some 
dual use inputs (gasoline and tires, for example) subject to rationing. 
5 Military spending and manpower tripled between 1940 and 1941, but it did so from a 
very low base, and only a small fraction of cumulative war expenditure had actually 
taken place at the time of the Japanese attack.  As a consequence, war related spillovers 
and learning by doing cannot have had much to do with achieved 1941 productivity 
levels. 
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6 For further discussion, see Field, ‘Most Technologically Progressive Decade’; 
‘Technological Change’. 
7 Data for the Lend-Lease program itself show a similar pattern.  The legislation was 
passed on March 11, 1941, and shipments did take place prior to Pearl Harbor; their rate 
of growth starting from a base of zero was of course astronomical.  But 1941 shipments 
comprised only about 3.2 percent of the cumulative total for the program between 1941 
and 1945; more than 96 percent occurred after 1941 (see U.S. Bureau of the Budget, 
United States at War, Chart 49, p. 412). 
8 Although many of the institutional foundations for war and postwar military 
procurement were established between May of 1940 and the declaration of war in 
December of 1941 (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, United States at War; Higgs, ‘Private 
Profit, Public Risk’), the actual impact of government regulation and control on the 
economy was relatively minor prior to 1942.  Effective control of retail prices, for 
example, did not begin until the General Maximum Price Regulation of May of 1942 
(Harris, Price and Related Controls, p. 9) 
9 Corroborative evidence for a peak in industrial production in late 1943 comes from data 
from the War Production Board, which show production of munitions alone peaking in 
the fourth quarter of 1943.  Production of aluminum, magnesium, zinc, and chemicals all 
peaked in 1943, as did new merchant marine tonnage (U.S. Bureau of the Budget, United 
States at War, Chart 15, p. 137, Chart 38, p. 300; Chart 41, p. 319). 
10 A somewhat analogous treatment of the disruptive effects of the war on capital 
accumulation (investment flows) can be found in Higgs, ‘Wartime Socialization’. 
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11  The evidence for this can be found in the very high rates of TFP growth in trucking 
and railroads, and to a lesser extent in wholesale and retail distribution (Field, 
‘Technological Change’. The build out of the surface road network created substantial 
spillover effects in both trucking and railroads.  Trucking successfully substituted for 
rails for certain routes and commodities.  But the two modes were also highly 
complementary, and trucking’s flexibility contributed to improved productivity in the 
railroad sector even in the presence of capital shallowing. One important mechanism was 
the smoothing of seasonal fluctuations in the demand for freight cars (see Field, 
‘Origins’).   
12 The 2.81 percent compound annual growth resulting from this exercise is very close to 
the 2.83 percent implied by the intercept term on the regression using 1929-41 data. 
13 On the other hand, the physical capital stock was used intensively during the war, and 
the depreciation allowances applied by government statisticians may not adequately 
account for the effects of wear and tear and deferred maintenance. This consideration 
could counterbalance an underestimate of the value of GOPO capital transferred to the 
private sector.  See Higgs, ‘Wartime Socialization’, pp. 515-517). 
14 Although there is no way of knowing if peacetime advance would have continued at 
the same rate throughout the 1940s in the absence of the war, had TFP advance between 
1941 and 1948 persisted at the rate of 2.78 percent per year rather than .49 percent, TFP 
in 1948 would have been 17.4 percent higher than it actually was. 
15 “In World War II, no combat plane that had not been substantially designed before the 
outbreak of hostilities saw major service” (Galbraith, New Industrial State, p. 18). 
16 See Searle, ‘Productivity’, or Alchian ‘Reliability’, for detailed discussion. 
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17 Even with respect to general human capital formation, one must keep in mind that 
many of the war production workers, particularly women, left the labor force after the 
war.  
18 See especially the series of articles by Higgs already referenced, as well as work by 
Edelstein and Rockoff. 
